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1 Introduction 
 
 The current crisis, and the responses to it, seem to have delivered a death blow 
to neo-liberalism. The extent of state intervention, even if primarily to rescue the 
financial system (and the economy more broadly) from further collapse are simply 
astonishing. I can do no better to indicate both the scale and the priorities involved 
than by quoting Hall (2008, p. 6):2 
 
- the total value of the renationalisations of banks and insurance companies in 
the USA, UK and the rest of Europe is approximately equivalent to reversing 
about half of all the privatisations in the entire world over the last 30 years. 
- the USA renationalisation of the insurance company AIG is by itself 
equivalent to reversing all the privatisations that have taken place in the 
former communist states of central and eastern Europe since the collapse of 
communism. 
- the UK government liability for the debts of Northern Rock alone is greater 
than the combined total value of all the private finance provided through PFI 
and PPP schemes in the UK and the rest of the EU over the last 17 years. 
 
Another way of seeing the scale of the rescue is to note that the total cost of 
constructing sewers and water systems throughout the world’s cities, to provide 
household connections for water and sewerage for over ¾ of the urban population 
in developing countries, would require only about €280billion – about 5% of the 
guarantees already given to the banks. 
 
It should also be added, of course, that these measures were initiated in the closing 
days of Bush’s presidency. How could the world’s leading neo-liberal, as it were, be 
so interventionist or, as some have put it, introduce socialism for the bankers and 
capitalism for the rest of us? 
 
 No doubt neo-liberalism has been delivered a resounding blow in both 
ideological and material terms. If there are any neo-liberals left, they are liable to be 
keeping a low profile,3 just as China now has no Maoists, South Africa no racists, and 
Britain no Thatcherites.4 But, significantly, questions over the nature of neo-
liberalism, even whether it is a legitimate category of analysis, had already been 
raised prior to the current crisis. As Noel Castree (2006, p. 6), a leading Marxist 
geographer, concludes, “I suspect ‘neoliberalism’ will remain a necessary illusion for 
those on the … left: something we know does not exist as such, but the idea of whose 
existence allows our ‘local’ research finding to connect to a much bigger and 
apparently important conversation”. One major reason for the scepticism over neo-
liberalism concerns its diversity and complexity across time, place and issue, with a 
corresponding lack of distinctiveness as far as the neo-liberal component is concerned 
in the local application – Bush is surely neo-liberal but he nationalises banks and 
insurance companies! This problem has been explicitly addressed by Ferguson (2007) 
in the context of social policy, for he appropriately charts the extent to which the 
rationale for a Basic Income Grant (BIG) in South Africa has often been provided by 
progressives in deploying arguments that are borrowed from the neo-liberal portfolio. 
He reasonably asks, p. 83/4: 
 
When activists, trade unionists, and others opt to seek concrete economic 
improvements for the poor by adapting to the reality of neoliberalism and 
speaking its language, are they simply falling into a trap by allowing issues of 
power and policy to be framed within a grotesque liberal vision of society that 
reduces all human activity to the pursuit of capital by (more and less 
impoverished) “entrepreneurs”? Or are they using the space that 
democratization has opened up to create new and potentially promising forms 
of political struggle - not acquiescing in an overarching (and anti-poor) 
neoliberal design for society, but rather taking up and creatively redeploying 
neoliberal concepts and discursive moves in the service of a fundamentally 
different political end? 
 
He concludes that, “We will also need a fresh analytic approach that is not trapped 
within the tired ‘neoliberalism versus welfare state’ frame that has until now obscured 
many of the key issues from view”, p. 84.5  
 
 There are two separate issues involved here although they are closely related. 
One is whether neo-liberalism is too heterogeneous to allow let alone warrant an 
acceptable characterisation. No one can doubt the diversity to which it is attached and, 
yet, it also seems to capture the grander, possibly illusory, character of the past thirty 
years or more, not least by comparison with the putative Keynesian era that preceded 
it.6 Are we in danger of throwing out the neo-liberal baby (even as it has grown-up) 
with its mucky and murky bathwater? Second, though, is the strategic purchase to be 
made of neo-liberalism. Should it be contested as a descriptor of our reality or 
rejected, not least in the attempts to replace it with something else? 
 
 These conundrums can be addressed, even resolved, by appeal to three aspects 
of neo-liberalism that do render it a reality and one that must be strategically 
contested. First, and brought sharply into relief by the current crisis and the responses 
to it, neo-liberalism, and its counterpart in globalisation, are heavily underpinned by 
an extraordinary expansion and promotion of financial activity. This will be discussed 
in Section 2, where it will be argued that the nature of neo-liberalism, its persistence 
and its legitimacy as a descriptor of the last few decades, is a consequence of 
financialisation. Indeed, with resonances with Lenin’s shorthand depiction of 
imperialism as the monopoly stage of capitalism, we can dub neo-liberalism as its 
financialised stage! 
 
This is, however, not to reduce neo-liberalism to finance and, as argued in 
Section 3, as for any other society, neo-liberalism offers a complex, shifting and 
contradictory amalgam of ideology, scholarship and policy in practice. That such 
contradictions exist should scarcely surprise, and addressing them offers an 
opportunity to explore the diversity associated with neo-liberalism rather than to 
reject the notion altogether as its consequence. Further, this diversity is itself 
variously distributed across time, place and issue. In particular, neo-liberalism will be 
argued to have gone through two broadly delineated phases, with the passage from 
one to the other explaining the illusion that neo-liberalism is ephemeral. Instead, the 
second phase has primarily been associated with sustaining financialisation, the key 
characteristic of neo-liberalism. In the concluding remarks, some strategic 
implications are drawn for the coming period. 
 
2 Financialisation … 
 
 Financialisation is a relatively new term and has its roots primarily in 
heterodox economics and Marxist political economy, Fine (2007), although it is liable 
to be increasingly adopted by orthodoxy. It has also been understood in a number of 
different ways. First, at the most casual level, it refers to the astonishing expansion 
and proliferation of financial markets over the past thirty years, during which the ratio 
of global financial assets to global GDP has risen three times, from 1.5 to 4.5, Palma 
(2009).7 That this might be indicative of dysfunction – why do you need three times 
as many financial services proportionately to oil the economy than previously – has 
previously been much overlooked precisely because of the market success of 
financialisation in terms of growth and rewards. As the variously infamous former US 
Treasury Secretary, Chief Economist at the World Bank, Head of Harvard, and 
currently Obama’s chief economic advisor, Larry Summers, has described the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis, cited in Davidson (2008a): 
 
The ultimate social functions are spreading risks, guiding investment of scarce 
capital, and processing and dissemination the information possessed by 
diverse traders … prices always reflect fundamental values … The logic of 
efficient markets is compelling. 
 
The logic today is less compelling, not least to the bankers themselves who had 
previously deployed it to rationalise what is now being revealed to be a reality of 
inefficient, dysfunctional and parasitical markets, with a rather different meaning 
materialising in the crisis to the notion of “spreading risks” than the intended 
reduction! 
 
 Second, financialisation has been associated with the expansion of speculative 
assets at the expense of mobilising and allocating investment for real activity. This is 
most notable in the ex post recognition of the lax regulation of the financial sector, 
and corresponding calls to put the speculative milch cow back in the barn and reduce 
the contamination between speculative and real investments. That real investment 
itself is speculative, being contingent upon uncertain future returns, and that 
competition in financing depends upon expanding systemic risk by potential 
contagion at a greater rate than individual risk, are not necessarily overlooked. But 
greater restraint is called for between barn and field. 
 
 Third, this is because financialisation has been understood as both the 
expansion and the proliferation of financial instruments and services. These have 
given birth to a whole range of financial institutions and markets, and corresponding 
acronyms that are simply bewildering, quite apart from futures markets for trading in 
commodities yet to be produced (for which carbon is the most fetishised) and, most 
infamously of all, sub-prime mortgages. 
 
 Fourth, at a systemic level, financialisation has been located in terms of the 
dominance of finance over industry. Empirically, this is not a matter of finance telling 
industry what to do as recent trends have witnessed corporations relying less rather 
than more upon the financial system to fund its operations. Yet, especially in the 
United States, even non-financial corporations have necessarily been caught up in the 
process of financialisation as they have increasingly derived profitability from their 
financial as opposed to their productive activities. Indeed, as the Financial Times 
journalist, Martin Wolf has put it:8 
 
The US itself looks almost like a giant hedge fund. The profits of financial 
companies jumped from below 5 per cent of total corporate profits, after tax, 
in 1982 to 41 per cent in 2007. 
 
The corresponding implications for the level, pace and efficacy of productive activity 
have been highlighted by Rossman and Greenfield (2006: 2) from a labour movement 
perspective: 
 
What is new is the drive for profit through the elimination of productive 
capacity and employment … This reflects the way in which financialization 
has driven the management of non-financial companies to “act more like 
financial market players”. 
 
More generally, Stockhammer (2004) has been at the forefront in arguing that 
financialisation has been at the expense of real investment. 
 
Fifth, for some, not least as a defining characteristic of neo-liberalism itself, 
financialisation is perceived to be a strategy for redistributing income to a class of 
rentiers, Palma (2009) but Lapavitsas (2009) for a contrary view. Certainly, as is only 
too well-known, the rewards to finance systemically and individually have been 
astonishing not least, once more, in the United States, where real incomes for the vast 
majority of the population have stagnated over the last thirty years and any 
productivity gains have accrued to the top 1% of earners whose share in GDP had 
risen from less than 10% to more or less double this.  
 
Sixth, though, again with the United States in the lead, consumption has been 
sustained by the extension of credit, not least through the use of capital gains in 
housing as collateral. For some, this has been part and parcel of the leading role 
played by financialisation in exploiting workers through provision of financial 
services at abnormally high levels of banking profits, Lapavitsas (2009) and dos 
Santos (2009) but Fine (2009c) for a critique. This is, however, a single element in the 
much broader system of financial arrangements at the global level that has witnessed 
huge balance of trade and payments deficits for the United States, matched by a 
corresponding holding of US dollars as reserves by other countries (with dramatic 
increases for China in particular). This is a consequence of neo-liberal policies to 
relax if not eliminate exchange controls, opening economies to vulnerability to capital 
movements and, thereby, requiring high levels of reserves as a safeguard. The 
paradox is that with all its deficits and minimal interest rates, the US dollar has not 
suffered a collapse despite failing to follow the neo-liberal policy advice on such 
matters that it has sought to impose on other countries through the World Bank and 
IMF when similarly inflicted by deficits of lesser magnitudes. Previous crises 
elsewhere have been used to facilitate financialisation by opening up financial 
markets to international, and especially US, participation.  
 
However financialisation is defined and used, it points to a complex amalgam 
of developments within global finance and in its interactions with, and consequences 
for, economic and social life more generally. Further, it is not merely the expansion 
and proliferation of financial markets that are striking but also the penetration of such 
financing into a widening range of both economic and social reproduction – housing, 
pensions, health, and so on. Whilst different approaches, and contributions, to 
financialisation may offer different emphases, there is equally a need to locate it 
within a theory of finance itself. My own approach is to deploy and develop both 
logically and historically Marx’s theory of accumulation and base this upon the 
categories of analysis offered by him throughout the three Volumes of Capital.9 More 
specifically, Marx’s theory addresses accumulation as the quantitative expansion of 
productive capital through its restructuring – generally into larger units variously 
organised in the modern world through multinational corporations for example. 
Crucially, though, the pace and rhythm of the restructuring of capital is dependent 
upon agencies other than industrial capitalists themselves, and the restructuring of 
other forms of capital, in markets and finance, as well as through more general 
restructuring, or reproduction and transformation, of economic and social life. Each of 
these elements may be more or less conducive to accumulation by restructuring as 
well as uneven in effects; their impact is contingent upon configurations of economic, 
political and ideological interests and conflicts within the bounds set by their location 
with the global system of accumulation as a whole. And, in particular, the role of the 
state as agent of restructuring is paramount across all of the constituent factors 
involved, including the exercise of force and legitimisation through other means of 
the dysfunction, inequities and iniquities of contemporary capitalism. 
 
For financialisation itself, the role of finance in economic and social 
restructuring has become paramount both directly (financial restructuring) and 
indirectly through other agencies, such as the state, and other mechanisms such as 
consultancies, policy influence and so on. In addition, Marx’s theory of finance draws 
the distinction between capital in exchange functioning at a rate of return tending to 
equalise with the rate of profit on enterprise and interest bearing capital which is 
advanced to promote and/or appropriate surplus value through competitive 
accumulation and, as such, is neither free of competition nor subject to equalised rate 
of return as it is itself a major agent of competition (as means of access to capital). 
Moreover, the accumulation of interest bearing capital corresponds to the 
accumulation of fictitious capital, paper claims to surplus value which circulate at 
prices that are at least nominally independent of the accumulation of productive 
capital and can float entirely free of it as in speculative booms of shorter or longer 
duration and spread of assets. Further, as the process of financialisation has gathered 
strength, it has witnessed the corresponding shift of the command of productive and 
other commercial capital to the imperatives of interest bearing capital at a systemic 
level. 
 
To put it pithily, the expansion of markets in general (for which read private 
capital) under neo-liberalism (as with all aspects of privatisation and 
commodification) has underpinned the expansion of finance in particular. Further, 
financialisation, as the key distinguishing feature of the neo-liberal era, is what 
justifies the latter term both in itself and in its effects by marking the contrast with, 
and even the reversal of, the previous Keynesian period. This is not simply a matter of 
macroeconomic policy but the heavy subordination of economic and social policy 
more generally to the dictates of the promotion of markets in general and especially of 
finance. Irrespective of the theory of finance to which it is tied, the critical literature 
reveals from a variety of perspectives that financialisation: 
 
1. Reduces overall levels of accumulation of real capital as financial instruments 
and activities expand at its expense. 
2. Prioritises shareholder value, or financial worth, over other economic and 
social values. 
3. Pushes policies towards conservatism and commercialisation in all respects. 
4. Extends influence more broadly, both directly and indirectly, over economic 
and social policy. 
5. Places more aspects of economic and social life at the risk of volatility from 
financial instability and, conversely, places the economy at risk of crisis from 
triggers within particular markets.10 
 
Thus, first and foremost, neo-liberalism is underpinned by financialisation as the key 
defining characteristic of the world economy over the past thirty years, this both 
explaining and, to some degree, concealing its significance as such through appeal to 
a state-market dualism that does not fit the neo-liberal age comfortably as the 
concept’s critics correctly observe. 
 
3 … as Neo-Liberalism 
 
Thus, the extreme nature and extent of state intervention in the current crisis 
should not blind us to the extent to which the state has continued to intervene over the 
entire period of neo-liberalism, albeit under the ideology of non-intervention or, 
paradoxically, as intervention to free the market or to make it work. Of course, what 
marks out the current crisis is both its depth and its origins – especially from within 
the most financialised and developed economies, with the United States in the lead 
closely followed by the United Kingdom. But it is not as if there has been a previous 
absence of (financial) crises. Significantly, for the IMF, Laeven and Valencia (2008, 
p. 5) are able to “identify 124 systemic banking crises over the period 1970 to 2007”. 
They further report on “the data collected on crisis containment and resolution 
policies for a subset of 42 systemic banking crises. The list of crisis countries consists 
of: Argentina (four times), Bolivia, Brazil (two times), Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia 
(two times), Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Russia, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, and Vietnam”. They go on to add, as if only a matter of time is involved, 
“that the financial crisis in the United Kingdom and United States is still ongoing at 
the time of writing of this paper, so the analysis of crisis containment and resolution 
policies for these two countries is preliminary and incomplete”, p. 18.11 In other 
words, despite the severity of the crisis, it looks very much like (abnormal) business 
as usual without any sense that the world economy, and global order, might be 
undergoing a major transformation.  
 
 What is striking in this list of countries (Scandinavian and the Uniteds apart) is 
that they are developing or transitional. Their own hundred or more crises in the past 
do not appear to have precipitated a loss of legitimacy of neo-liberalism. Indeed, 
policy responses to financial crises over the period from 1970, the more so as we 
move towards the present, have been dominated by neo-liberals prescriptions, with 
the IMF to the fore. Significantly, and totally unreasonably, at least in some respects, 
Laeven and Valencia draw the conclusion that, “Future research should also review 
and draw lessons going forward from policy responses to the current financial turmoil 
in the US and UK. Our preliminary assessment is that these policy responses have 
much in common which those employed in previous crisis episodes, though it is too 
early to draw any conclusions on the effectiveness of these responses given that the 
crisis is still ongoing.”, p. 31. This is a total rewriting of the history of financial crises 
and the responses to them. It is as if the extremes of intervention now being deployed 
to shore up the financial system of the developed world, and its corresponding breach 
with neo-liberalism, especially as it was previously espoused by the IMF both as 
ideology and in policy practice, had been the common response in the past. In more 
detail, to quote at length, we find neo-liberal prescriptions proposed in parallel with 
the ones that are now being deployed in response to the current financial crisis, p. 30: 
 
Policy responses to financial crises normally depend on the nature of the crises 
and some unsettled issues remain. First, fiscal tightening may be needed when 
unsustainable fiscal policies are the trigger of the crises, though crises are 
typically attacked with expansionary fiscal policies. Second, tight monetary 
policy could help contain financial market pressures. However, in crisis 
characterized by liquidity and solvency problems, the central bank should 
stand ready to provide liquidity support to illiquid banks. In the event of 
systemic bank runs, liquidity support may need to be complemented with 
depositor protection (including through a blanket government guarantee) to 
restore depositor confidence, although such accommodative policies tend to be 
very costly and need not necessarily speed up economic recovery. All too 
often, intervention is delayed because regulatory capital forbearance and 
liquidity support are used for too long to deal with insolvent financial 
institutions in the hope that they will recover, ultimately increasing the stress 
on the financial system and the real economy. Our preliminary analysis based 
on partial correlations indicates that some resolution measures are more 
effective than others in restoring the banking system to health and containing 
the fallout on the real economy. Above all, speed appears of the essence. As 
soon as a large part of the financial system is deemed insolvent and has 
reached systemic crisis proportions, bank losses should be recognized, the 
scale of the problem should be established, and steps should be taken to ensure 
that financial institutions are adequately capitalized. 
 
In short, it is as if the interventions now being undertaken are perceived to be 
consistent, at least contingent on outcomes yet to be realised in the USA and the UK, 
with the best practice that can be gleaned from the past. It is to be suspected that there 
are a large numbers of bankers with experience of those earlier crises who will find 
little comfort or realism in the more interventionist interpretation of their treatment at 
the hands of the IMF. As always, one rule for the rich and powerful, another for the 
poor and dependent.  
 
 But the purpose here is less to mount a polemical assault upon the IMF as it is 
expansively endowed and reinvented (or not), in order to assume a more prominent 
role in the world of global finance. Rather, it is to emphasise: first, just how much 
intervention there has been in the past to keep the financial system going with some 
degree of success, at least in terms of containment, in the past; and, second, how such 
measures have now failed despite their weight and, as previously observed, a 
significant degree of solidarity with the dollar.  
 
This is, in turn, suggestive of a periodisation of neo-liberalism into two 
phases, however roughly they will need to be delineated across different aspects. The 
first might be dubbed the phase of shock therapy and runs to the early 1990s. But it 
originates much earlier and much more widely than for the transition economies of 
eastern Europe. It is concerned to release the role of financial markets to the fullest 
extent and, with it, goes the release of “market forces” or conditions conducive to 
private capital accumulation more generally, as with privatisation and deregulation in 
all of their forms and across a widening range of activities. For wherever there are 
markets, and payments, there is the opportunity for finance to prosper whether 
directly or indirectly. 
 
The second phase of neo-liberalism, running to the present day, has two 
aspects. On the one hand is the need to respond to the dysfunction and conflict that 
has resulted from the first phase, most dramatic in the case of eastern Europe, for 
example.12 On the other hand, as most dramatically revealed by the current financial 
crisis, is the imperative of sustaining and not just ameliorating the process of 
financialisation. Symbolic of this is the level of state funding that is being made 
available to sustain the financial system in circumstances of extreme crisis when, in 
better times, such funding could not be made available for health, education and 
welfare. In other words, the second phase of neo-liberalism has been more overtly and 
extensively interventionist in order to sustain the process of financialisation both, and 
primarily, on its own terms and through soliciting a modicum of acceptability given 
the extreme inequalities and iniquities to which it has given rise. Paradoxically and 
ironically, it is precisely the interventionism associated with the second phase of neo-
liberalism that has sewn academic doubts about whether it does exist and is a 
legitimate category of analysis whilst, within the political arena, those associated with 
Third Wayism and the social market, for example, present themselves as critics of, 
and departing from, neo-liberalism.  
  
This is all indicative of dissonance between the ideology and the policy of 
neo-liberalism, although the nature of that dissonance is different across the two 
phases. First and foremost, as Panitch and Konings (2009) have effectively argued, 
the process of financialisation has been the consequence of the role of the state, not 
due to its withdrawal. Second, in addition, this has been reflected in corresponding 
contradictions across ideology, policy and scholarship with economics to the fore in 
this respect. The first phase of neo-liberalism was marked by the extraordinary rise to 
prominence of the New Classical Economics, based on the notion that markets work 
perfectly and the state is ineffective other than in potentially distorting efficient 
microeconomic outcomes. Significantly, it has been taken as point of departure for the 
new micro-foundations of everything, the economic as well as the non-economic, 
with market and institutional imperfections to be corrected on a piecemeal basis. As 
Stiglitz (2008: 2) puts it, defining the “left” precisely in these terms: 
 The left now understands markets, and the role they can and should play in the 
economy … the new left is trying to make markets work. 
 
But where we see “markets”, we should read “capital in general”, and where we see 
“capital in general” we should read “finance in particular”. 
 
 Thus, for all the rhetoric and scholarship in favour of re-introducing the state 
into a greater role that preceded as well being accelerated with the current crisis, 
policies in practice often reflect a greater commitment to using the state to support the 
role of the private sector in general and that of finance in particular. This is true, for 
example, of supposed rethinks over privatisation and pension reform, the more so now 
that the crisis has struck.13 As it were, the shock therapy got as much privatisation and 
private financial participation as possible, and now the state must both pick up the 
debris and push the process much more fully through its own support.  
 
4 Concluding Remarks 
 
 One of the remarkable features of the current crisis is that no one is blaming 
the poor, etc, for the crash and its aftermath. Far from it, unlike other instances of 
economic malfunction in my own life-time and beyond, excessive wages (money or 
social), have not been targeted as causal as has occurred in the past not least in 
legitimising the shift and shifting of the burden of adjustment upon working people 
and the poor. Instead, finance and its excesses are to blame but it must be rescued in 
order to prevent an even worse impact upon the rest of us which is, thereby, 
legitimised. Not your fault but the milk is spilt, the pitcher is bust, and so we have to 
work together to fix it with less to go around in the meantime. 
 
 In addition, despite its severity, unprecedented as such since the end of the 
post-war boom and, by some accounts, worse than the thirties, the current crisis marks 
the closing phase of a longer thirty-year period of slowdown in accumulation, 
certainly relative to the “Keynesian” period that preceded it. Whatever the rhythm of 
short-term volatility over the past decade or more, the crash and its severity are not 
the simple result of some manic, overstretched phase of accumulation whose 
contradictions, tensions and conflicts have induced a corresponding reaction in the 
opposite direction. Indeed, conditions would appear to have been as favourable as 
they could be to capital accumulation in light of low levels of economic and social 
wages, weakness of labour and progressive movements at national and international 
levels, expansion and “flexibility” of the workforce through China and female 
participation in the workforce, and neo-liberal hegemony in policy, politics and 
ideology. In this paper, I have essentially suggested that financialisation has been a 
major factor in the slowdown under neo-liberalism, given its direct and indirect 
impact on the economic and social restructuring of capitalism, and that this also holds 
the key to understanding the current crisis and responses to it as well. 
 
For, of course, it is precisely the relative weakness of progressive movements 
that means that neo-liberalism has both lost its legitimacy and that the insertion of 
alternatives, other than more or less diluted forms of a return to Keynesianism, have at 
most limited support and momentum behind them. This raises the question of how to 
locate the role of class struggle in these circumstances when it seems both weak and 
removed from its classic location at the point of production. Of course, one of the 
mantras of neo-liberalism is “flexibility” in labour markets, and that flexibility in 
practice is imposed through state intervention on behalf of capital through legislation 
and, where possible and necessary, authoritarianism. These have served as 
complements to the declining strength of working class organisation and activism, 
whilst the presence and interests of organised labour in social reproduction have also 
been considerably weakened through depoliticisation, privatisation and so on. This all 
poses both an analytical and a strategic challenge and, well before the crisis, these 
have been variously addressed in terms of the emergence and salience of new social 
movements and the demise of the working class and capitalism as we know them. 
 
How are we to respond in such circumstances, acknowledging that there will 
not be an absence of struggles but that these are liable to be fragmented and dispersed, 
not least because of the effects of neo-liberalism itself as an economic and social form 
of governance? In addition, it is important to recognise the extent to which, in the 
broadest sense, the institutional ethos and capacity to deliver alternative policies have 
been eroded in the passage from the era of Keynesian, interventionist and welfarist 
modernisation. Today’s bureaucrats have been trained and have become accustomed 
to function in the wake of thirty years of neo-liberalism. 
 
Much insight in these respects can be derived by drawing upon, and 
developing critically, the following quote from Sir Josiah Stamp, reputedly the second 
richest man in the UK in the 1930s, a manager for Nobel industries, head of the 
British chemical company, ICI, a member of the board of the Bank of England, and 
even head of the British Inland Revenue Service:14 
 
Banking was conceived in iniquity and was born in sin. The bankers own the 
earth. Take it away from them, but leave them the power to create money, and 
with the flick of the pen they will create enough deposits to buy it back again. 
However, take it away from them, and all the great fortunes like mine will 
disappear and they ought to disappear, for this would be a happier and better 
world to live in. But, if you wish to remain the slaves of bankers and pay the 
cost of your own slavery, let them continue to create money. 
 
This is a most wonderful exposé of the power and ethos of money, how it can and 
must be overcome.15  
 
But it is also limited in a number of ways. First, it focuses exclusively on 
distributional issues – who gets what rather than how much there is to get – and 
without specifying the mechanisms by which this is done other than through the flick 
of a pen. Indeed, as suggested here, financialisation not only draws upon ever greater 
rewards, it does so by reducing those that are available to others. Second, Stamp only 
structures power and privilege by reference to the bankers versus the rest of us. This is 
by no means either central, given finance’s dependence upon industry, nor sufficiently 
refined in terms of differentiation within classes of slaves and enslaved, as well as by 
race and gender and so on. Third, as observed, how and whether the flick of the pen or 
some other mechanism reproduces inequalities, that go beyond fortunes at one 
extreme and slavery at the other, is itself highly differentiated from the restructuring 
of the economy and labour markets through to the separate elements of economic and 
social provision across housing, health, education and so on. Such differentiation in 
practice both by process and constituency (employed/unemployed and so on) is itself 
a source of fragmentation to be acknowledged and overcome in order to sustain 
progressive advance, both to secure and make secure alternative policies and 
outcomes. 
 
In this light, if more by way of analogy, consider a different context of how to 
galvanise progressive change across fragmented constituencies and issues and, in a 
sense, the dialectical antithesis of finance, commodity consumption and the role of the 
consumer and consumer politics. Elsewhere, Fine (2005), I have argued that the latter 
is self-limiting for the following reasons. First, as we are all consumers, consumer 
politics is caught in the contradiction of presenting particular interests as if they were 
general, and this cannot be sustained the more effective the politics becomes and 
particular interests are promoted or defended. Of course, this is not unique to 
consumer politics as the same is true of citizenship, human rights, and, within borders, 
nationality, and so on. Thus, the most basic consumer politics of campaigning against 
higher prices tends to identify manufacturers, retailers, even government as purveyor 
of taxes and subsidies, as “the other”. But to be defined as opposition is equally to 
fragment the universal category of the consumer and to open up the need for a unity 
of organisation and purpose that includes some and excludes others.  
 
Second, consumer politics is not only about price and quality but also 
concerns the ethics of consumption itself, ranging from sustainability of the 
environment to the working conditions and wages of sweatshops and child labour. 
This implies, once again, not only that the consumer’s politics are differentiated by 
issue and constituency but, even if not recognised as such, the consumer is also prised 
away from the market and attached to social issues more generally. The consumer 
becomes a citizen and, correspondingly, the politics becomes broader and different, 
not least attaching itself to a discourse of rights and needs as opposed to equality (and 
inequality) before the market alone. 
 
Third, as consumer politics evolves, it inevitably traces its concerns not only 
across the broader terrain of citizenship but also backwards to the origins of products 
in the systems of production, distribution and exchange. This can lead to, or even be 
inspired by, antipathy to private provision, with demand for public provision instead 
as with health, education, and so on. It can depart the narrow focus on the product and 
its terms of availability to address, as mentioned, conditions of work and concern for 
the environment. The result is to reinforce the tensions across the consumer/citizen 
and universal/particular interests and divides and to transform consumer politics into 
something else that further reinforces those tensions and divides. For, in case of 
public consumption (notably absent from postmodernist, discursive accounts of 
private consumption), the issue becomes one of the welfare state (and, not 
surprisingly, commercialisation of public services is concerned to present citizens as 
consumers and not vice-versa). Otherwise, it is a matter of, for example, trade 
unionism and the environmental movement. Consumer politics is limited in practice 
not only in what it does but in its very existence because it becomes different and 
something else the more it is collectively pursued and succeeds.  
 
Much the same must be true of the struggles and conflicts that will arise in the 
wake of the current crisis of neo-liberalism with these not necessarily originating 
with, but ranging beyond and dominating, consumer concerns to address employment, 
wages, social provision, and so on. Of necessity, progress requires framing the way in 
which strategic alliances might be formed that strengthen, broaden, unify and 
transform such individualised, often financialised, struggles not only for more 
provision and but also for different modes of provision that reach beyond finance to 
the conscious, collective and social control of production itself. 
 
Footnote
 
1
 This paper draws from across many of those listed in references. 
2
 See also Naudé (2009) on the G-20 Summit: 
 
Many have already remarked on the fact that huge amounts of money have 
been found at short notice to bail out banks, but that money to bail out the 
world’s bottom billion can never be mobilized. Contrast for instance the $50 
billion agreed on for developing countries at the summit with the estimated 
$8.4 trillion for bailing out banks. As Oxfam recently remarked, the latter 
amount is sufficient to end extreme poverty worldwide for 50 years. 
 
3
 With the immediate exception of opposition to Obama’s health care plans! 
4
 The leader of the conservative Tory Party condemned a leading member of the Party 
for entering the US health care debate by way of criticism of the UK’s National 
Health Service. 
5
 Nor is Ferguson alone in questioning the liberal use of neo-liberalism in addressing 
social policy. For Molyneux (2008, p. 775): 
 
The term neoliberal is widely used as shorthand to describe the policy 
environment of the last three decades. Yet the experience of the Latin 
American region suggests that it is too broad a descriptor for what is in fact a 
sequenced, fragmented and politically indeterminate process. 
 
See Fine (2009a) for a discussion of social policy in the age of neo-liberalism. 
6
 For a sophisticated account, with case studies from South Africa, of the association 
of neo-liberalism with diversity and specificity as opposed to reductionism, see Hart 
(2002 and 2008). And, for my own account, see Fine (2009b) 
7
 In absolute terms, global financial assets rose from $12 to somewhere between $196 
and $241 trillion from 1980 to 2007, Blankenberg and Palma (2009, p. 531). 
8
 ‘Why It Is so Hard to Keep the Financial Sector Caged’, Financial Times, February 
6, 2008, cited in Michael Perelman, “How to Think about the Crisis”, 
http://www.monthlyreview.org/mrzine/perelman131008.html 
9
 For some account of how this approach emerged and its application with references, 
see Fine (2008). See also Fine and Saad-Filho (2010). 
10
 As eloquently observed by dos Santos (2009, p. 180/1), the crisis has not derived 
from a tulip bulb, South Sea Island or dot.com bubble, or even stock market or 
commodity crash, although these have witnessed considerable speculative turmoil in 
the period leading to the crisis: 
 
By many historical measures the current financial crisis is without precedent. 
It originated from neither an industrial crisis nor an equity market crash. It was 
precipitated by the simple fact that increasing numbers of largely black, Latino 
 and working-class white families in the US have been defaulting on their 
mortgages. 
 
11
 They do concede that, “The data show that fiscal costs associated with banking 
crises can be substantial and that output losses are large”, p. 30. The text here draws 
upon Fine (2009g). 
12
 Apart from collapse in levels of (industrial) production, Stuckler et al (2009), for 
example, find that the mass privatisation programmes in eastern Europe increased the 
short-term adult male mortality rate by a staggering 12.8%. 
13
 See Bayliss and Fine (eds) (2008) on privatisation and Fine (2009a and b) on social 
policy. 
14
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josiah_Stamp,_1st_Baron_Stamp 
15
 It is neatly complemented by the following, cited in Wade (2009, p. 539): 
 
Two executives sit at a conference table studying documents, and one says to 
the other, “These new regulations will fundamentally change the way we get 
around them”, New Yorker, cartoon, 9 March 2009. 
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